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ABSTRACT: Knowledge plays an important role in argumentation. Yet, recent work shows that standard 
conceptions of knowledge in epistemology may not be entirely suitable for argumentation. This paper 
explores the role of knowledge in argumentation, and proposes a notion of knowledge that promises to be 
more suitable for argumentation by taking account of: its dynamic nature, the defeasibility of our 
commitments, and the non-monotonicity of many of the inferences we use in everyday reasoning and 
argumentation. 
 





Knowledge1 plays an important role in argumentation. Not only does knowledge 
frequently describe the initial-state and desired end-state of argumentation, but it can 
even have a role in justifying moves made within argumentation from the initial to the 
end-states. 
 Because of the important role that knowledge plays in argumentation, one might 
expect that argumentation theorists have a relatively well-worked out, clearly-defined, 
and uncontroversial notion of it. Surprisingly though, this seems not to be the case. 
Instead, it would seem that argumentation theory lacks a workable notion of knowledge, 
and furthermore that other branches of philosophy are unable to supply such a concept in 
a straightforward way. 
Before going any further, it is perhaps worthwhile to make a quick point about 
something that we are not trying to do in this paper. It is commonly held that there are 
several theoretical approaches available to the study of argumentation. Lumer (2005, pp. 
 
1 In this paper we are concerned primarily with propositional knowledge (knowledge that p), as opposed to 
procedural knowledge (knowing how to a, where a is some activity or action), or direct knowledge 
(knowing o, where o is some object). When, in the paper, we speak of knowledge in an unqualified sense, 
we should be understood as restricting our considerations to cases of propositional knowledge. 
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189-190) contrasts rhetorical and consensus theories with epistemological ones. 
Epistemological theories might be distinguished in that they conceive of argumentation 
theory as – to use Mark Battersby’s apt phrase – applied epistemology, and further take 
epistemology to supply or underwrite at least the normative components of the theory. 
Biro and Siegel (1992, p. 96), for example, write that “An argument succeeds 
epistemically (rather than rhetorically, pragmatically, etc) to the extent that it advances 
the knowledge of the arguer or her audience or provides good reasons for the belief or 
acceptance of a proposition.” In this paper, we make no argument against epistemological 
approaches to argumentation so conceived. Our argument in this paper is not so much 
about how the study of argument should be approached, but rather deals with how the 
notion of knowledge should be conceived by any theory of argument. 
In this paper we examine some of the prevailing notions of knowledge for their 
suitability in argumentation theory. We begin by describing the role that knowledge plays 
in argument and inquiry. We proceed to set out two of the more common definitions of 
knowledge, one from modal epistemic logic and the other from normative epistemology. 
We then note several problems with attempts to apply these existing accounts of 
knowledge in argumentation theory. Observing these problems in view of the role 
knowledge plays in argumentation suggests a pragmatic approach to conceiving 
knowledge in argumentation might be more promising. In adopting this perspective, we 
conclude by providing a set of criteria which any notion of knowledge suitable for 
argumentation theory should meet, and propose a provisional definition of knowledge for 
the purposes of argumentation. 
 
THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN ARGUMENT 
 
In order to specify a concept of knowledge suitable for argumentation, it is worthwhile to 
first consider the kind of work that the concept performs in argumentation theory. 
Knowledge can play at least three roles in argumentation. 
First, knowledge often describes the starting place, or initial-state of 
argumentation. That is, argumentation commonly begins from premises or shared 
commitments which are not merely accepted or supposed for the sake of argument, but 
which are known. 
Second, knowledge about some issue can describe the desired end-state of many 
instances of argumentation. Inquiry, or argumentation which aims at the discovery of the 
truth of a matter, implicitly aims at knowledge. Epistemic theories of argumentation have 
used this point to justify their theoretical approach. For example Siegel and Biro (2005, p. 
92) write “it is a conceptual truth that the central aim of arguments is to yield knowledge 
or reasonable belief.” Feeling that epistemology is uniquely able to provide a suitable 
account of the nature of knowledge, this thesis about the goal of argumentation puts 
epistemological theorists in the position of being able to certify or reject the results of 
argumentation as epistemically fit, and thereby evaluate various processes of 
argumentation according to their ability to produce the desired results. 
Third, knowledge can play a reason-giving role in argumentation. That is, 
premises which assert that a certain claim is known (either commonly, or by some agent), 
or that an agent is in a position to know some claim, can be used as a reason for the 
acceptability either of the claim itself or some other claim. 
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Many common forms of this type of reasoning are exemplified in the 
argumentation schemes. The most obvious instances of cases where knowledge plays a 
reason-giving, or warranting, move in argument is the common-knowledge argument, and 
the position to know argument. Yet, other argumentation schemes which do not explicitly 
rely on knowledge premises often implicitly do so. For example, Walton (1999, p. 58) 
writes that “appeal to expert opinion is justified as a reasonable type of argument because 
the expert is in a position to know.” Blair (2001, pp. 377-378) argues that the more 
general form of argument from authority similarly relies on knowledge 
Consider the argument from authority, one form of which is the argument from 
expert opinion. Why may we rely on the authority of others? The answers lies in an 
analysis of authority or expertise. A necessary condition of authority is knowledge. 
If someone has knowledge in an area, then among other things they know a number 
of propositions belonging to it.2
Also, something similar seems to be going on when appeals to popular opinion are 
legitimately used argumentation. Walton (1999, p. 110) has argued that 
many appeals to popular opinion have an epistemic component built in. In other 
words, many claims to popular opinion, when analyzed carefully, are not just 
claims that everybody believes such-and-such. They are implicitly or explicitly 
claims that everybody believes such-and-such because such-and-such proposition is 
common knowledge. 
Finally consider reasoning from lack of knowledge. The argumentation scheme for 
argument from ignorance has two premises in which knowledge, or lack of it, plays a 
reason-giving role (Walton, 1996, p. 254). 
 
Argumentation Scheme for Argument from Ignorance 
 
Lack of Knowledge Premise: Proposition A is not known to be true (false). 
Conditional Premise: If A were true (false), then A would be known to be true 
(false). 
Conclusion: Therefore A is false (true). 
 
The conditional premise depends on how complete the knowledge base is, in a given 
case. For example, suppose the question asked is whether Guyana is a major rubber 
producer in South America, and the knowledge base we have about rubber producers in 
South America contains a lot of knowledge about this subject. If Guyana were a major 
producer, that knowledge would almost certainly be contained in the knowledge base. 
Suppose we look through the knowledge base, and the proposition ‘Guyana is a major 
rubber producer’ is not known to be true. We could then conclude, on the basis of an 
argument from ignorance, that Guyana is not a major rubber producer. Thus argument 
from ignorance, or argument from lack of evidence as it might better be called, is often 
                                                 
2 Immediately following the passage just quoted, Blair goes on to link the notion of knowledge to truth, 
writing: “But a proposition cannot be known unless it is true. So there is a connection between the expertise 
of an authority and the truth of at least some of the propositions for which the expert vouches. Although 
this account drastically oversimplifies the appeal to authority, I think it is au fond the connection between 
authority, knowledge and truth that authorizes inferences from what authorities or experts claim to be the 
case to the plausibility of those claims.” 
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reasonable even though it depends on what is known, what is not known, and how well 
what is known, or not known, is known. 
 
Some features of knowledge as it applies to argumentation 
 
Our approach in this paper presupposes that knowledge has the types of roles in 
argumentation which we have just described. On that basis we search out a satisfactory 
account of the nature of knowledge. Given that knowledge is properly understood to have 
these functions in argument, what are some of the qualities that knowledge must have in 
order for it to do so? 
The first noteworthy quality of knowledge as it applies to argumentation pertains 
to the knowledge states of rational agents (i.e., arguers). Rational agents are epistemically 
finite entities whose knowledge states can be incomplete. This situation helps explain the 
use of argumentation in inquiry – to gain new knowledge thereby expanding an agent’s 
knowledge state. Not only are agents epistemically finite, but they are cognitively limited 
in epistemically important ways: they can forget things they once knew, and they cannot 
always be expected to understand – and therefore to know – extremely complex things 
(e.g., facts or claims). 
In addition to having limited knowledge, rational agents also have finite reasoning 
abilities. This means that agents cannot always be expected follow extremely long or 
complex chains of reasoning or argument. Nor can they be expected to know all of the 
implications of their current knowledge state, and perhaps not even any particular 
implication or consequence without some opportunity for rational reflection or guidance. 
Finally, finitely rational agents cannot be expected to detect every inconsistency either 
manifest or latent in some knowledge-base (or set of claims). As a result, while 
knowledge-bases are ideally consistent, in fact they may not be. 
A third important feature of knowledge as it applies to argumentation concerns 
the type of support required for properly justified (i.e., rationally acceptable) knowledge 
claims.3 If the types of arguments discussed above can, in some circumstances, provide 
adequate justification for acceptance, then knowledge claims can be based on defeasible 
support. This means that support for knowledge claims can be defeated (undermined or 
overridden) as new information comes to light. This fact, combined with the idea that 
knowers are epistemically limited leads to the idea that knowledge claims are themselves 
defeasible. More generally, we tend to think of epistemic agents – even rational ones – as 
fallible. Because of this, the standard of certainty does not seem appropriate for all claims 
to knowledge. Agents can make a legitimate claim to knowledge and yet be wrong, and 
part of the job of argumentation, and rational inquiry more generally, is to help them to 
get things right. Sometimes getting things right simply involves discovering new 
knowledge, while at other times getting things right involves giving up some existing 
claims to knowledge and perhaps replacing them with different claims. 
The general picture of knowledge as it applies to argumentation, then, is a 
dynamic one whereby knowledge is not a fixed state but is always in flux. Knowledge 
                                                 
3 In this paper, we use the phrase “knowledge claims” in a broad sense to include not only claims 
attributing knowledge to a third-party subject (S knows that p), but claims-to-have-knowledge made my 
some individual subject whether tacit or explicit. As we discuss below, it is often possible to understand S’s 
assertion that p, to be a tacit claim that she (S) knows that p. 
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can increase through learning and discovery. Knowledge claims, even properly justified 
ones, can be subject to retraction as new information is acquired. A consequence of this 
general picture is that we are not always right about everything that we justifiably take 
ourselves to know. 
Some may be inclined to describe this situation as “we do not know everything 
that we justifiably take ourselves to know.” We do not think that this approach is useful 
from the perspective of argumentation, since it only allows us to classify an item as 
knowledge at the end of a process of inquiry – indeed some would say only when the 
fact-of-the-matter about the item’s truth is known. While we admit that an item’s status as 
knowledge is ideally classified at the end of inquiry, in this paper we draw attention to the 
fact that knowledge has a role in the process of inquiry itself. Thus, what argumentation 
requires is a concept of knowledge that allows items of knowledge to be identified at the 
beginning of a process of inquiry, even if this identification is only tentative and subject 
to retraction as the process of inquiry proceeds. 
 
SOME PREVAILING NOTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE & ATTENDANT PROBLEMS 
 
Having briefly considered how the idea of knowledge seems to work in argumentation, 
let us now turn to the topic of what account of knowledge best suits this situation. The 
most convenient situation for argumentation theorists would be if they could turn directly 
to epistemology and simply employ some pre-packaged notion of knowledge. Yet, recent 
work has shown that the prospects for this are not entirely promising. 
 
The Assumptions of Rationality 
 
One prominent concept of knowledge is modeled in the formal systems of modal logic. 
Here, knowledge is characterized by the following four assumptions of rationality: 
 
1. veridicality: K(S,p) e p 
knowledge-bases contain only truths; if p is known then p is true 
 
2. consistency: ~[K(S,p) & K(S,~p)] 
knowledge-bases are consistent; if p is known then it is not the case that not-p is 
known 
 
3. deductive closure: K(S,peq) e [K(S,p)eK(S,q)] 
knowledge bases are closed under deduction; agents know all of the logical 
consequences of the claims they know 
 
4. iteration: K(S,p) e K[S,K(S,p)] 
the contents of knowledge-bases are transparent to knowers; if p is known, then it 
is known that p is known 
 
Walton (2005) calls this the idealized model of knowledge, and shows how it is 
unsuitable for the purposes of argumentation. In the first place, none of the assumptions 
typically hold for the kinds of knowers involved in argumentation (whether human or 
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artificial agents). Often times, our knowledge-bases, commitment-stores or belief-sets are 
not consistent (either inter- or intra-agent), and nor is it the case that everything we take 
ourselves to know (even by the best available rational lights) is true. So these 
assumptions certainly do not seem to be descriptively accurate. Nor are they suitable as 
norms, since they do not all represent appropriate ideals for rational knowers with a finite 
cognitive endowment. For example, Harman (1986, p. 12) has argued that the assumption 
of deductive closure is inappropriate as a normative principle of reasoning because it 
violates the principle of clutter avoidance (“One should not clutter one’s mind with 
trivialities”). 
 
Knowledge as True Belief Plus 
 
Perhaps the most familiar philosophical definition of knowledge is captured by 
Zagzebski’s (1999, p. 93) phrase that knowledge is “true belief plus something else.” 
 On this type of account, propositional knowledge is explained as some form of 
“good true belief” (Zagzebski 1999, p.99). Such accounts require that knowledge meet at 
least three conditions: a doxastic condition (belief);4 an alethic condition (truth); and an 
epistemic condition (goodness). The “goodness” of knowledge has been explained in a 
variety of ways, including justificationist, evidentialist, causal, and reliabalist (to mention 
a few). Further, it might turn out that different cases of knowledge will require different 
explanations of the epistemic condition. 
 Accounts of knowledge as true belief plus have been adopted by many theorists 
working within an epistemological approach to argumentation (Lumer 2005a, p. 190; 
2005b, p. 215). Indeed, Lumer (2005a, p. 192) has gone so far as to claim that theories 
which use the term ‘knowledge’ in a sense different than that adopted within normative 
epistemology – which, Lumer claims, relates knowledge and justified belief to objective 
truth conditions (e.g., by identifying knowledge with the current stock of expert opinions) 
– do not count as epistemological approaches. 
This notion of knowledge as rationally-held true belief has an important, and often 
neglected, role in argumentation pertaining to the assertoric speech acts made during the 
process of argumentation. Grice (1989) has argued that these acts should be regulated by 
the maxims of conversational implicature (the Principle of Cooperation, and the four 
categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner). Of particular interest in the is the 
category of Quality, under which falls the supermaxim 
• Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
and the two specific maxims: 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false, and 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
While some dialectical accounts of argumentation have incorporated versions of the 
conversational maxims as regulative norms for the activity of argumentation, others have 
taken adherence to the maxims to be partly constitutive of making a genuine speech act, 
and thereby making a genuine move in an argumentative exchange. What is important is 
that together they amount to the regulation that one should not assert anything that one 
                                                 
4 As Zagzebski (1999, p. 93) writes, “The idea that the knowing state is a species of the belief state 
undergrids the almost universal practice in epistemology of defining knowledge as true belief plus 
something else.” 
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does not take oneself to know. While maxim 1 is weaker than “say only what you believe 
to be true,” the combined force of the maxims of Quality seems to be that one should 
assert only what one believes one has adequate evidence for the truth of – in other words, 
assert only what one takes oneself to know. Thus there is an important sense in which the 
rationally-held true belief picture of knowledge factors into the very texture of the 
process of argumentation as a regulated series of speech acts. 
 On the other hand, this account seems too restrictive to explain the actual role of 
knowledge in the process of argumentation and inquiry. For example, Godden 
(forthcoming) has shown that the true-belief-plus account of knowledge fails to explain 
the argumentative goodness of patterns of argument which seek to justify a claim whose 
acceptability is at issue by an appeal to common knowledge. More problematic, though is 
the alethic condition which is shared by the true-belief-plus account and the assumptions-
of-rationality account above. (The veridicality assumption that only truths can be known 
is common to both accounts.) Intuitively this assumption makes good sense, for it seems 
queer to say that we can know falsehoods. Further, maintaining the truth condition for 
knowledge preserves an important distinction between knowledge and justified belief. 
Problematically though, maintaining the truth condition seems to significantly 
impede the role that knowledge can play in the process of argumentation. For example, 
consider the reason-giving role that knowledge plays in schemes like argument from 
expert opinion. If the opinion of an expert is only acceptable when her opinion can 
independently be shown to be true, then there is no need to accept the opinion on the 
basis of the expert’s authority. Rather, one should accept the opinion on whatever 
grounds one used to independently verify its truth. Similarly with items of common 
knowledge and popular opinion, matters of testimony and other cases where appeal is 
made to an agent’s being in a position to know 
Further, given that the agents in argumentation are epistemically, cognitively and 
rationally finite and fallible, it is not reasonable to expect every claim to knowledge made 
at the beginning of the process of argumentation be manifestly or demonstrably true prior 
to inquiry. If this were the case, then one is forced into a kind of skepticism where the 
process of inquiry itself would often never begin, while in other cases it would be 
redundant. Instead, disputed cases might properly be denied and become the subject of 
further inquiry. Undisputed cases, on the other hand, should be admitted provisionally 
subject to inquiry and retraction in appropriate circumstances. 
 
KNOWLEDGE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 
 
Against the idealized conceptions of knowledge just outlined, we propose that 
argumentation theorists adopt a perspective which might be called, to use Hans 
Vaihinger’s apt phrase, “epistemological utilitarianism” (Rescher, 2000, p. 8).5 We feel 
that such a pragmatic approach to knowledge is especially fitting given that the role of 
knowledge in argumentation incorporates the dual features of antiscepticism and 
fallibilism which Putnam describes as “perhaps the basic insight in American 
Pragmatism” (Pragmatics, 21). 
                                                 
5 There Rescher writes: “Hans Vaihinger characterized pragmatism as ‘epistemological utilitarianism’ 
(erkenntnistheoretischer Utilitarianismus), Philosophie des Als ob (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1924; original ed. 
1911). 
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Walton (2005) has proposed a pragmatic conception of knowledge which is built 
upon two common-sense platitudes that capture our everyday epistemic situation in the 
world: (1) a knowledge-base can be incomplete, and (2) a knowledge-base can be fallible. 
A knowledge-base can be incomplete in the sense that there can be many true claims 
which are not included in the knowledge base. That is, the “closed-world” assumption is 
typically not met in everyday situations. Further, “[o]n this [pragmatic] model, 
knowledge is defeasible, meaning that a proposition now known may later be refuted 
(defeated as knowledge)” (Walton 2005, pp. 59-60), thus allowing for retraction in the 
process of inquiry, investigation, and discovery. Epistemic agents have to operate in 
conditions of uncertainty, incomplete knowledge, and often even contradictory 
information. 
It is with this type of situation in mind that Walton (2005, pp. 63-64) proposes the 
pragmatic model of rationality and its attendant account of knowledge. According to the 
pragmatic model of epistemic rationality, a group of interacting agents is collecting data 
as part of a search for the truth of a matter they are investigating. As they go along during 
the search process, they verify or falsify hypotheses by testing them against the data they 
have collected so far, at the same time as they are engaged in the process of collecting 
new data. As the search for knowledge continues, some hypotheses become better and 
better supported by the evidence, but the same time, some of the hypotheses previously 
accepted have to be given up, because they are falsified by the new data that are 
streaming in. Depending on the type of investigation, for example it might be a scientific 
investigation over a legal inquiry, there will be an established proof standard that enables 
the investigation to determine whether a proposition can be accepted as proved or not. 
This pragmatic model of epistemic rationality is dynamic, meaning that whether a 
proposition is accepted as knowledge at any given point depends on the standard of proof 
and the data that has been collected to that point. A proposition rightly said to be known 
to be true at a given point in the investigation could later on turn out to be proved to be 
false. Or at a particular point, the set of data collected at that point could justify two 
hypotheses, one of which is not consistent with the other. In this model, a particular 
proposition might rightly be classified as knowledge at one point in the investigation, 
whereas at a later point, the same proposition might turn out to be no longer classified as 
knowledge. In general, whether the proposition is rightly said to be knowledge or not 
depends on its rational acceptance, given the evidence then for it, as balanced against the 
evidence then against it, at that point in the investigation. In this pragmatic model, 
knowledge is not defined as justified true belief, or even as any kind of belief. It is based 
on the evidence collected at a given point in the investigation, on the kinds of arguments 
that can properly be used to justify a claim in that type of investigation, and on the 
standard of proof set for knowledge in that type of investigation. On this model, the strict 
barrier between discovery and verification of knowledge characteristic of older ways of 
thinking in analytical philosophy is no longer absolute.  
 
CONCLUSION: DEFINING KNOWLEDGE FOR ARGUMENTATION THEORY 
 
As the theory of argumentation and the discipline of informal logic developed, several 
challenges to standard notions of knowledge emerged. Perhaps best known among these 
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is the rejection of deductive validity as a universal standard of evidence or justification 
required to make a claim to knowledge at the conclusion of the argumentative process. 
Accompanying this rejection of deductive validity as the only suitable link between 
premises and conclusions in arguments was a rejection of certainty as a requirement of 
knowledge. For example, Langsdorf (1998, p. 495) observed that Toulmin (1995, p. x) 
identified certainty, along with representation and individualism,6 as three underlying 
assumptions characteristic of a Cartesian research program, a program for which Toulmin 
sought to provide an alternative. 
For many theorists, this abandonment of certainty meant more than saying that 
people’s confidence in claims which they can justifiable be said to know can be less than 
100% – even though they are, in fact, right. Rather, abandoning certainty as the only 
standard of knowledge involves the more controversial concession that people may 
justifiably claim to know something, even though the may end up being wrong. Perelman 
(1989) for instance, described his conception of knowledge as follows: 
I shall grant the status of knowledge to a tested opinion, to an opinion, that is, 
which has survived all we have a certain confidence, though no certainty, that it 
will resist all such future attacks. (Perelman, 1989) 
Importantly, taking such a position need not involve saying obviously false or dubious 
claims can be known, or that there is no difference between having knowledge and 
having a rationally justified belief. Agents can rationally hold a belief which should not 
be counted as knowledge when their justification for that belief seems good from a 
subjective perspective, but objectively the belief cannot be rationally justified or conflicts 
with what is demonstrably true or most probable (or plausible). Knowledge is something 
which not only has withstood the scrutiny of the past, but will withstand all future 
scrutiny as well. 
 An important feature of these pressures from within argumentation was to tie the 
concept of knowledge to the process by which knowledge is generated, discovered and 
certified. As Kuhn (1991, p. 200) wrote: 
Only if knowledge is seen as the product of a continuing process of examination, 
comparison, evaluation, and judgment of different, sometimes competing, 
explanations and perspectives does argument become the foundation upon which 
knowing rests. Knowledge is never complete or finished, but rather remains open 
to further argument. 
By linking knowledge to the process of inquiry, and by recognizing the role that 
knowledge plays in that very process, we come to conceive of knowledge as dynamic and 
open to further scrutiny. 
 
Knowledge in Argumentation: Initial Conditions 
 
Having set forth some problems accompanying typical accounts of knowledge in 
epistemology and modal epistemic logic, we proceed to postulate some conditions that 
any conception of knowledge suitable for argumentation theory will have to have. As 
initial conditions, then, we propose the following: 
                                                 
6 Roughly, Toulmin describes these assumptions as follows: (i) certainty: knowledge is structured as 
‘demonstrably certain’ systems; (ii) representation: knowledge is an inner state of the mind; and (iii) 
individualism: knowledge is a ‘personal and individual accomplishment’ (Toulmin 1995, p. x) 
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1. Knowledge bases can be incomplete and even inconsistent. These conditions take 
account of the fact that rational agents are epistemically and cognitively finite. 
 
2. Knowledge is, for the most part, defeasible. This comes not only from the idea 
that arguers are finite rational agents who are fallible, but also from the idea that 
most of the reasoning on which rationally-held knowledge are based is defeasible 
rather than deductively valid. As such, 
a. Certainty and manifest or demonstrable truth is often an inappropriate 
standard for knowledge. 
b. Knowledge claims must be retractable under the right sorts of 
circumstances. 
 
3. Knowledge is the result of a process of inquiry. This in turn suggests a dialectical 
conception of knowledge, whereby existing knowledge can continue to be tested, 
and is subject to retraction. Knowledge must not only be undefeated at present, 
but it must be able to answer new objections, and to survive testing and critical 
scrutiny in new circumstances. 
 
4. Whether or not something is rightly classified as knowledge or not depends on the 
standard of proof set for the investigation, which in turn depends on the type of 
investigation that is supposed to be underway. Such matters are sometimes 
described by the use of the expression ‘burden of proof’. 
 
Defining Knowledge for Purposes of Argumentation Theory 
 
With these initial conditions in mind, we proceed to propose an alternative definition of 
knowledge for argumentation theory. Instead of defining knowledge as rationally-held 
true belief, it is better defined for purposes of argumentation theory as justified 
acceptance of a proposition based on evidence and supported by rational argumentation 
to a specified standard of proof. The specified standard has to be reasonably high to 
distinguish between propositions that can rightly be said to be knowledge versus 
propositions that can be reasonably accepted as based on evidence, but where the 
evidence is not so strong that we would call the proposition knowledge. The standard of 
proof is specified by the context. 
The paradigm instance of knowledge is scientific knowledge. A proposition may 
rightly be said to be an item of scientific knowledge if it is supported by rational 
argumentation of the kind used in a particular scientific discipline to the standard of proof 
appropriate for what counts is knowledge and that does not. This definition of knowledge 
would be classified as a pragmatic definition in that it varies with the context, and in 
particular, is defined in relation to the standards and methods accepted in a scientific 
field, and now the standards and methods are applied to yield evidence in that field. 
Another important pragmatic implication of this definition of knowledge is that it puts 
much more of an emphasis on the notion of evidence and one finds in traditional theories 
of knowledge in philosophy. Evidence is based on appearances, or things that appear to 
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be true, that fit in with other appearances in a consistent manner, and that can be tested, 
by experimentation or other means. 
We can have lots of evidence in favor of proposition and no evidence against it, 
but later on, has more evidence comes in we might find that this proposition is false. This 
characteristic is sometimes called defeasibility or verifiability of a hypothesis. It is 
important for scientific knowledge that it be represented as open to defeat this new 
evidence comes in. This defeasibility requirement, however, may be inconsistent with the 
traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. For if a proposition really is 
true, presumably it can turn of the later to be false. This requirement is consistent with the 
notion that sometimes propositions are accepted as scientific knowledge that later on turn 
out to be disqualified or rejected as knowledge, once a new experimental findings come 
in, or a new theory comes in that offers a better explanation than the previous one. 
A problem for the theory concerns statements made in everyday conversational 
argumentation where somebody says ‘I know this proposition is true’ as opposed to 
saying ‘I think it is true’. When I say I know that this proposition is true, often it is taken 
to mean that I’m very confident that it is true. This is not what is really meant by 
knowledge however. I can be very confident that something is true even though the 
evidence that I have does not really support my belief that it is true to the standard of 
proof that should be required to license such an assertion. Thus in the case of the term 
‘knowledge’, and ordinary language approach can only take us so far, and can even be 
misleading. The reason, in this instance, is that logical positivism is pervasive in 
generally accepted ways of speaking about things. It’s not just the philosophers who have 
adopted this viewpoint. 
Thus when I say that I know something, or say that it is knowledge, it should 
mean that I have strong enough evidence to support and to meet a standard of proof 
justifying my including it under the category of knowledge. But in ordinary discourse 
such assertions are often ambiguous. I could mean that I’m claiming that this proposition 
is scientific knowledge, or I could mean merely that I am very confident about its being 
true, independently of whether I have good evidence for claiming that I know that it’s 
true or that it can be taken as knowledge. Another tricky aspect here is the shift between 
the abstract noun knowledge and the verb ‘know’. 
So to say that something is knowledge or that some person or group knows it, it is 
important that the proposition claimed as knowledge be based on evidence of a kind that 
reaches a level where the proposition passes beyond the level of being accepted as true 
because it is based on evidence. Only when it is proved by a certain kind of evidence, that 
is sufficient for the discipline, or more generally the context in which the proposition was 
claimed, can something be properly said to be knowledge. 
Another question is how you can prove that something is knowledge. There are 
two different routes. If you’re a scientist in a particular discipline you may claim direct 
access to the evidence, especially if you are a specialist who has done the research work 
that is taken to prove that proposition and question. Such a case could be called one of 
direct knowledge. But this kind of case is relatively rare. Most of us base our opinions on 
what his knowledge or what is the on what the experts say, very often the scientific 
experts in the relevant domain. Even colleagues in the field will base what they take 
knowledge to be on this kind of criterion. 
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Implications 
 
In this paper we have argued for a picture of knowledge which we feel is better suited to 
the actual role which knowledge plays in argument, without advocating any particular 
approach to the study of argumentation. Yet, we suggest that our proposals concerning 
the conception of knowledge have some implications for the relationship between the 
various approaches to argumentation theory. 
For some time there has existed a tension between dialectical approaches to 
argumentation and epistemological ones. Epistemological approaches have distinguished 
themselves from so-called consensus-based approaches on the grounds that 
epistemological approaches are oriented towards external standards such as truth while 
consensus approaches forsake these (Feldman 2005, pp. 282-283; Lumer 2005a, p. 192). 
We have suggested that the product called ‘knowledge,’ and the criteria used to judge 
something as knowledge be linked to the process which generates knowledge. Yet, this is 
not to forsake external standards, or to deny that truth is (except in special cases) agent-
independent. Truth is not produced by argumentation; but knowledge of the truth can be. 
The point is that while truth is an objective criterion for knowledge and rational 
acceptability, truth is not an especially useful criterion in cases where it is not manifest, 
apprehended, or demonstrable – in short unknown. As such, in order that external 
standards be usefully employed as criteria for assessment, their method of employment 
must be specified as well (Huss, 2005). Setting a Cartesian standard of accepting 
something as knowledge only if it can be proved beyond all possibility of doubt is 
rejected as unrealistic. Thinking of knowledge in a positivistic way as a body of true 
propositions floating out there in a remote space where human agents cannot see it, 
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